We design infrastructure that exposes nothing: inbound access arrives through outbound tunnels, every admin interface sits behind strong authentication, and secrets never live in a Git repository.
Most incidents don’t come from a sophisticated exploit but from needless exposure: a database reachable from the internet, an admin panel protected by a single password, a test service left running on an open port. These situations almost always come from an architectural choice made by default, not from a deliberate decision.
Our starting position is simple: nothing is exposed until it needs to be, and whatever must be exposed travels a controlled, authenticated and logged path.
The conventional approach opens ports 80 and 443, publishes an IP address, and then defends that door: firewall, rate limiting, intrusion detection. It works, but it demands constant vigilance — and one badly written rule reopens the gap.
The outbound-tunnel approach inverts the logic. With Cloudflare Tunnel, a cloudflared agent establishes an encrypted outbound connection to the Cloudflare network itself. Visitors reach Cloudflare, never your server directly. What follows from that:
We add Cloudflare Access in front of sensitive interfaces — back offices, administration tools, staging environments. The user authenticates against your identity provider with MFA, and the application never sees an unauthenticated request. Someone leaving the team means immediate revocation, with no shared password to rotate.
A container image built without care often ships a full operating system, a shell, build tooling and a process running as root. We apply the same rules every time: minimal base image, unprivileged user, read-only root filesystem where the application allows it, Linux capabilities reduced to what is strictly needed, and vulnerability scanning on every build in CI.
On Kubernetes this comes with admission policies, NetworkPolicies that forbid unplanned pod-to-pod traffic, and RBAC that is genuinely restrictive — not cluster-admin handed out for convenience.
No protection is absolute. So the honest question isn’t only “how do we prevent an incident?” but “how long until we’re running again, and with which data?”.
That’s why we treat backups as a security function in their own right: encrypted, stored off-site, unreachable from the production server — the condition for surviving ransomware — and above all restored regularly to prove they work. The real restore time is measured and written down, not estimated at the moment you need it.
The easiest attack surface to remove is the one you never open. We replace direct entry points with controlled outbound connections.
Knowing who reaches what, and being able to revoke it in one action. Admin interfaces should never be reachable with a password alone.
A container is not a virtual machine: its security is decided when the image is built as much as when it runs.
Security includes the ability to go back: after human error, corruption or ransomware.
cloudflared) runs next to your application and opens an outbound connection to the Cloudflare network. Visitor traffic reaches Cloudflare, then travels back down that already-established tunnel. Your server therefore has no inbound port open and its IP address doesn’t need to be public: a port scan finds nothing to attack.Migration, redesign, taking over an existing setup or starting from scratch: tell us your context and we'll come back with a first technical opinion — no strings attached.